

<b>DISPATCH</b>		<b>KAPOK</b> <b>S E C R E T</b>	<b>SYMBOL AND NO.</b> <b>Dg. ECOW-1653</b>
TO	Chief of Station, Germany	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.	
INFO	Attn: [ ] and [ ]	74-124-29/3	
	Chief of Base, Munich		
	Chief of Base, Frankfurt		
FROM	Chief, SR	DATE 30 JUN 1960	
SUBJECT	REDWOOD/REDSKIN/AERODYNAMIC Improvement of KUNZE Product of AERODYNAMIC Project	RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)	
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ACTION REQUIRED	Acceptance of ABCASSOWARY/29's assignment to Frankfurt to be directed by FOB	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S)			

1. The coincidence of two observations concerning current KUNZE activities led Headquarters to re-examine carefully the operational possibilities of the AERODYNAMIC Project. First, it was observed that constant efforts over several years to derive substantial KUNZE yield from expensive operations involving emigre organizations as now constituted and as now directed by KURAKA have proved utterly abortive. Second, it was observed that comparatively substantial REDWOOD KUNZE yield had been reaped from short-term trips by legal travelers - particularly Americans - who had been briefed and trained by KURAKA to simply use their eyes and ears, their memories and sometimes their cameras, with reference to requirements (most often physical targets) of interest to us.

2. In re-examining our emigre projects generally, all the familiar empirically established limitations on their exploitability for classical espionage purposes were recognized; particularly, the predominating self-interest of emigre organizations, their insecurity as a result of opposition penetration or blabber among their members or both, and their intractability. It appeared, however, that the exploitation of the ABCASSOWARY/1 organization specifically, in contrast with perhaps all the rest, is not critically limited by these factors and not limited by some of them at all. As set forth in detail in the attachment hereto, there has never been any problem with the tractability of the ABCASSOWARY/1 organization, nor, insofar as we have been able to judge over a 12-year period, with its security. While its self-interest predominates by very definition, I have personally confirmed by conversation with ABCASSOWARY/2 that he sees that self-interest coinciding almost precisely with the interests of OBYEKE. (The only aberration is apparently where the former espouses the cause of nationalist separatism and the latter overtly professes non-predetermination - which divergence is hardly likely to affect ABCASSOWARY/1-KURAKA cooperation.)

3. We therefore concluded that the inadequate KUNZE yield from the AERODYNAMIC Project, assuming as we still do that the potential is there, stems not from limitations inherent in the ABCASSOWARY/1 organization, but from our own omission to take the measures best calculated to realize that potential. Therefore, as explained in detail in the attachment, we have taken the time and trouble to set up an organizational and procedural system, to clear, train and brief key personnel, and to press ABCASSOWARY/2 exhaustively to supply the basic "GI" (biographic profiles and "who-knows-who" studies on all his assets) conspicuously lacking in the past. All this we have done in the hope that we can thereby significantly tap the relatively large number of Ukrainian emigre travelers to the Soviet Ukraine, as well as Soviet Ukrainians traveling in the West, for KUNZE profit at least in the form of visual-aural observation reports and at most in the form of recruited reporting sources inside the Soviet Union.

4. The operational desirability of making this effort strikes us as threefold: first, we would enlarge and sophisticate the spotting and assessing capabilities of ABCASSOWARY/1 with resultant benefit to operations run by us unilaterally or through them; second, we would achieve considerable proliferation of our capability to run the short-term briefed traveler type of operation and at the same time perhaps liberate some case officer strength, hitherto preoccupied by this type of endeavor,

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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FORM 10-57 53 (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS SI-28, SI-28A AND SI-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	PAGE NO. <b>1</b>
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CONTINUATION OF  
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for concentration on the longer range, more difficult task of establishing inside classification assets; and third, we would be in a position to run the short-term briefed traveler type of operation without attributability to ODEME, which seems particularly significant in this early post-S-2 era.

5. We think it highly desirable that ARCASSOARY/29 be stationed in Frankfurt rather than in Munich for a number of reasons, principal among which are Frankfurt's remoteness from the curious eyes and ears of the dominant espionage community in Bavaria and the greater convenience of Frankfurt as a starting point for speedy transportation to various parts of Western Europe. He should be handled and directed by a case officer in the Soviet Branch or FOB because his work is directly in line with the mission of that Branch. We are well aware of the personnel shortage of which the Base has repeatedly complained but, if we are right in our expectation that this Project will multiply KURSK cases far beyond the capability of a single case officer to handle directly, we should think that FOB would consider it desirable to assign one case officer the responsibility of managing it full time. Your attention is invited in this regard to the fact that ARCASSOARY/29 can be handled in English, nor do we believe that the case officer need have a Ukrainian background. Indeed, while some knowledge of Ukrainian affairs would undoubtedly enhance the case officer's rapport with ARCASSOARY/29, we believe that any good case officer will quickly acquire such knowledge sufficient for the purpose and that the absence of Ukrainian background on the part of the case officer may well enhance his ability to direct the Project with a completely objective eye to the interests of KURSK exclusively.

6. You will note in the attachment that we are providing ARCASSOARY/29 with the documentation he needs to travel easily to other European countries. Needless to say, we would welcome any suggestions you may have for a better arrangement.

7. Since ARCASSOARY/2 is about to travel to Europe in July on the routine business of his organization as well as ARCASSOARY/1 activities connected with the Olympic games in Rome, and since it appears highly desirable that he personally introduce ARCASSOARY/29 to various ARCASSOARY/1 contacts and assets in Western Europe, we should like to get ARCASSOARY/29 to the field as soon as possible. If he could get there in time to exploit the Congress of Historians commencing in Sweden on 16 August, so much the better. Our exploratory discussion with Chief, WE Division has shown a disposition on his part to cooperate as fully as the realities of liaison considerations will permit, and we propose to coordinate closely with WE Division those ARCASSOARY/1 activities which affect West European countries. Your earliest favorable consideration of this matter would therefore be most appreciated and, upon receipt of your concuring views and comments, we shall prepare to dispatch ARCASSOARY/29 to Frankfurt promptly.

8. A biographic profile of ARCASSOARY/29 follows.

[ ]

Attachment: As noted above

28 June 1960

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee (w/att)
- 2 - GOB, Munich (w/att)
- 2 - GOB, Frankfurt (w/att)
- 1 - RI (w/att)
- 2 - SR/3 (w/att)

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Att. to KGBW-1653  
30 June 1960

1. Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to acquaint addressees with measures Headquarters has taken and proposes for the promotion or augmentation of the operational capabilities of AMBASSY/1, particularly regarding PI collection via KEDSKIN and contact operations. This does not represent the launching of a new project, but an endeavor systematically to revitalize and expand an old one.

2. Summary of Past Activities: While several readers are already familiar with Project AMBASSY/1, the present status of the project and Headquarters plans can be best put in perspective by a brief review of the past. Project AMBASSY/1 is older than any other going KGB project involving groups of erstwhile Soviet citizens. The original organization of which AMBASSY/1 is an off shoot, was an anti-Soviet political organization founded on present day Soviet Ukrainian soil during World War II as the governing body of an independence movement. Both in name and in program the Ukrainian liberation movement was and is widely known throughout the Ukraine through its partisan welfare and anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet propaganda activities, which were conducted in an organized centralized manner on Soviet soil from 1943 until approximately 1953. Towards the end of World War II, a representation of the parent governing group in the Ukraine, i.e., AMBASSY/1, was ordered abroad to seek liaison with and aid from Western governments to further the Ukrainian nationalist cause. Most members of AMBASSY/1 had been in one way or another directly involved with Ukrainian nationalist intelligence operations in the late 1930's and during World War II. By 1946 they were already trying to re-establish from Western Europe reliable, covert communications with underground headquarters in the Ukraine. More than any other Ukrainian group abroad, AMBASSY/1's target audience has been the population of the Ukraine and not the emigration.

In 1948, under Project IDEN, KUBARK examined the KGB's potential of all major emigre groups in Europe composed of World War II Soviet defectors. Out of about 30 groups studied, AMBASSY/1 was selected as the organization best qualified for clandestine KGB operations with KUBARK. Since 1948, activities under this project have fallen into three distinct eras:

a. The years from 1948 to 1953 included active KEDSKIN KUTSH operations with minor attention to KURAKH and KITIMOVIC. Although emphasis during this period was on PI production, the vagaries of intermittent communications by courier and V/T with AMBASSY/1 forces in the Ukraine did not permit anywhere near as favorable PI and operational results as KUBARK expected. Nonetheless, AMBASSY/1 KEDSKIN PI results, which admittedly seem meager compared with what is available via other types of operations today, were decidedly superior to those of other KEDSKIN endeavors of those years, in the

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position of KGB on Soviet Party Board. It was, however, all too clear by the early 1950's that KGB power, which in the USSR was then used to control all foreign & economic affairs, had reached its peak. In 1953, collapse of the Soviet economy caused the USSR to weaken, after which KGB's role began to wane, because no real power remained in its hands.

- b. On June 1953 or 1956 two assassinations by KGB agents and a few kidnaps were carried out. These were not mere operations, but acts of terror and terrorism. Major acts of KGB terrorism are the so-called 'KGB' kidnaps via the open route or terrorism to kill due to the war. The first kidnapping was a kidnapped Soviet citizen, General Gerasimov, who was taken to Moscow with a demand for ransom. This was followed by another kidnapping of a prominent Soviet general, General Ivanov, also for ransom.
- c. Between 1953 until 1959 are the kidnaps of three KGB agents: General, Major, 1st Lieutenant, and Captain. Operations against KGB agents and officials, however, always came from the KGB via a separate organization called ABKHAZIA/2 known under in the USSR.

The first major terrorist effort took place in 1953 at the "Mazda Hotel". This produced not only kidnaps etc., but also showed that as far as KGB over to major disconnected forces kidnaps than USSR than more independently to expand. (See Case History 1, in KGB, dated 10 June 1959.) The major ABKHAZIA/2 acts occurred in 1959 took place at the Vienna Rock Festival and at the Hungarian Trade Fair respectively. While existing conditions in the latter events were less propitious than at Brussels, interesting links on anti-Soviet Guerrillas were played up and the ABKHAZIA/2 agents used their ability both to set up disconnected anti-Soviet resistance organizations and to operate closely and well with them.

The ABKHAZIA/2 ran one rescue operation in summer 1959 involving a young agent with KGB status only. Although he was in the USSR for only a week, our man M. Gerasimov and several tens of volunteers held negotiations resulted from his trip.

Intelligence on the Soviet Guerrillas was also eliminated as the result of an ABKHAZIA/2 agent's trip to Moscow where he claimed to journalists who had access to information from the Central Register.

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**3. Major Deficiencies in Past Project AGRASSOWSKI Operations:**

AGRASSOWSKI/1 KURAKIN and contact operations over the past three years have been makeshift and by no means worthy of the opportunities available, nor of A/1's apparent potential. Many of the following deficiencies have stemmed, in large part at least, from KURAKIN's omission to assign staffers to the project, both at Headquarters and in the field, adequate in number to either the expense (now  annually) or the potential of the project:

a. The AGRASSOWSKI have not been adequately familiar with our strategic concepts, procedures and objectives; in addition, there have been no AGRASSOWSKI/1 personnel professionally trained by us and qualified to run operations as competently as some of our better contract specialists.

b. AGRASSOWSKI/2, the leader of the group and the man with the greatest amount of operational experience and responsibility, has been too busy himself and has not delegated enough authority to those subordinates who have worked with us briefly and on specific operations such as the Brusseles Plan. A/2's tight control of operations and his location in New York City, away from direct frequent case officer contact, have tended to inhibit both the planning and the conduct of operations.

c. During the years 1953 to 1958, mostly at our expense, KURAKIN activities (black radio, mailing to the Ukraine of publications for Soviet Ukrainians) expanded, with the result that the AGRASSOWSKI had little time or money left to spend on KURAKIN.

d. From roughly 1946 until summer 1958, the AGRASSOWSKI had a somewhat clouded, outdated picture of Soviet Ukrainian public opinion and of basic intelligence on Soviet reality needed to mount efficient KURAKIN or contact operations.

e. Briefing and training of KURAKIN legal travel agents handled by the AGRASSOWSKI has been inadequate by KURAKIN standards.

f. No deliberate system has been established for the quick transmission of AGRASSOWSKI/1 leads or other operational information to KURAKIN or for the consequent timely issuance of KURAKIN guidance or for prompt KURAKIN intrusion in the operation.

**4. Headquarters Action to Correct These Deficiencies:**

a. To get the AGRASSOWSKI thinking more in our own terms, AGRASSOWSKI/15 and 29 were given, at Headquarters, the most extensive and thorough training and briefing program (see paragraph 5 below) just administered to members of a KURAKIN exile group.

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3. For our own account and A/C have purchased 6 radios. One radio and some electronic equipment belonging to Ambassador and his wife were given him by Ambassador to Ambassador and A/C to permit him to communicate with KEMSA and others in Africa by way of the air.

c. The Black radio transmitter from KEMSA was also used, including new A/C can have for other uses than radio station and traffic.  
d. During the meeting of A/C and A/P, Ambassador has put some time on operations, and as related to us, a general one or kind of summary that he had not had any personally experienced. (Well, we could be surprised, but Ambassador had only a vague and old fashioned view of the situation according to the man can and cannot do, hardly went overall impression of public opinion, living conditions, political climate, etc. In the Soviet Union no press and only will with USSR information can other members may have had this to keep abreast of current developments in the Soviet Union via direct conversations with Soviet Delegation there, via publications or remaining textbooks, via writing of several hundred letters from the Ukraine and through regular study of news & series Soviet publications.)

e. We have detailed into ~~AMBASSADOR~~ 2, 15 and 19 that careful selection, assessment and training are indispensable to productive operators.

f. We have brought A/C to realize that the level of future support of his organization depends on good results in operations reported by KEMSA. Fortunately, he has always been just as interested in contact with reporting sources in the situation as we, even though his methods to get them have been erratic or unrepresented by our standards. In addition, due his organization, to remain vital, must either improve its touch with the Ukraine or Africa. In addition, he claims to be in full accord with our efforts to professionalize the operational methods of his organization.

g. Ambassador has communicated to the our satisfaction that there will be no conflict between the former and present activities of A/C. I.e., [ ] the Ambassador has no plans among himself, KEMSA, in particular about turning over clandestine Soviet operations involving KEMSA.

15. Personnel, Training, Security and Communications. That those personnel have to offer KEMSA in terms of personnel, as stated A/C has recent contacts in over 10 countries. These contacts would be able to take have been obtained through activities on behalf of Ambassador. Most of them have degrees from Western universities and may have graduate degrees. Presently, their cover for being in the area is that of graduate students. In

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other cases they are professional men who have become dedicated agents. In ADDITIONAL to A/2 and 33, A/2 has given us two non-combat operational agents over half of the remaining or more than half the E. At current price, the better agents and more talented of A/2's operational agents will be placed under A/30 and those in North and South America under A/3. In Vietnam, the local A/2 resident agent happens also to be an agent of the French military [ ] . Local contact with a French one officer can obviously be set up, although it is advised.

A/2 is an associate of A/1 group or long standing. It has been indicated via A/2 since the fall of 1960 that during 1961, including A/3, it was to be taken part in A/1 combat operations in Vietnam. Training and personnel, in an equivalent or an unknown quantity to known will be arrived in the U.S. in 1960 after completion studies at an American university (see later section). Following various assignments of A/30 and recruitment of A/35, both will begin a 12-week training program, including the two weeks of Photography and so. The program ended on 10 June, 1961, and final two days devoted to reviewing all requirements, instructions and other programming.

It is important to note that A/2 agents in several operationally diverse areas other where exists in the hundred cities. For example, in underground and clandestine activities in the United States are engaged in the organization. The ADDITIONAL have not tried to form a new organization, to coordinate the activities or to jockey for the approval of the organization, to the extent other groups have. Full-blown members of the A/1 organization were eliminated in the United States during or after W.W. II. There are only about 12 such full members abroad and only one of these, A/2, has been directly involved in A/1 COMINT human operations over recent years. Note A/2 agents are at the Brahmaputra River and their resident agents in several foreign countries are sympathizers, co-opted supporters and in some cases employees, but not full-blended members of the group. A/3 and 33 fall in the non-combat-agents category. They are former active members of the United underground movement and dedicated to the A/1 organization during or after the war.

Compared with other exile organizations from the USSR, the majority former members of an underground, they are generally to adhere to and not just talk about the need-to-know principle and compartmentation of operations. We have 12 years of operational experience with them as much to bear this conclusion. Since they are not interested in accepting new members into their

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inner circle, it would presumably be hard for the KIS to penetrate them via an outsider. Some bogus couriers were sent to them from the Ukraine in the late 1940's and early 1950's, it is true, but they automatically refused to take the chance of using any post-World War II defector or former courier in their sensitive operations no matter how reliable he seems. Obviously, Headquarters has no evidence yet that the inner circle of the A/1 group has been penetrated or is insecure.

As far as their honesty and cooperativeness towards KUBANK are concerned, after many years of cooperation we have no grounds for significant complaint.

6. Basic Agreement with AGRICULTURE/2: the following agreement was negotiated with A/2 in early 1950:

- a. From the A/2 side, A/15 is designated as Chief of Operations; he will continue to reside in Washington and will take direction from KUBANK; planned legal travel and contact operations in the Western Hemisphere will be his responsibility.
- b. All appropriate operational contacts and data for the accomplishment of his mission will be transferred to A/15 by A/2.
- c. A/2 need not be consulted on operational matters, but may be kept generally advised of operational activity by A/15 or KUBANK directly. He has agreed to impart this information to no one, expressing his confidence that his colleagues in the A/1 ruling council will be satisfied by A/2's assurance that he knows and approves what is going on.
- d. A/29 is senior operations officer for Europe, will take direction from KUBANK, and will receive from A/2 all unique contacts necessary for his planning and contact operations mission.
- e. Neither A/15 nor A/2 will enter unduly into problems connected with A/29's operations, except in the rare instance where A/2 feels the operation conflicts with A/1 basic interests. However, A/15 will receive a copy of A/29's routine reports from the Headquarters desk officer to be held in a secure area (unclassified property) together with his own operational records. Only KUBANK communications channels will be used to convey sensitive information from A/29 to A/15 or A/2.
- f. Knowledge of A/1 or KUBANK Ukrainian operations will be restricted on the A/1 side to those who need to know (cf. sub-paragraph c above).
- g. A/2, 15 and 29 will generally respect KUBANK's option to remove a lead or operation for unilateral KUBANK development.
- h. No formal written protocol to define this agreement will be prepared.

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<sup>7</sup> Further details will appear later in British publications. A similar set exists at Novosibirsk station as in a reference to setting X is based only provisionally on the names of these same stations in connection with the APPENDIX listed in paragraph 2 above. Information is more precisely based on information given by those who helped identify or the APPENDIX.

**Q.** Many of the Berlin citizens abroad who have accepted German recordings by name have done so reluctantly.

b. In a majority of the better Soviet unions I have seen, there double agents has been a tremendous minority.

other single Soviet nationality, including Russians.

As far as Headquarters is concerned, the existence of Brazilian  
communist nationalists at all levels of urban and particularly rural society  
in the United has ceased to be propaganda or legend, according to many leading  
nationalists who have been openly noted in recent years by various writers in the  
United. By persons talking with Forest Headquarters travelling abroad, in left-  
pens from the United and by the Soviet controlled press which are spreading  
the doctrine of nationalism in the United virtually daily. As an example of  
this type of western Headquarters has been getting an American nationalist,  
all names or the Soviet KGB-controlled guides at the Socialist Party  
nationalists further, according to [ ] "The League which of regular  
for political action (during the Socialist Party) and for delivery of letters to  
Vice President Bush came from Brasilia, who was very careful to identify

f. There is no evidence, as formerly feared, that the A/2 division is operationally handicapped by its alliance with opposed to usarian origins.

thus other KMT members demand more than the AMERICANS are able while uncertain nationalists try to force the issue.

likely to turn to the Soviet Union for money. In 1960, two of the main importers probably will add an important Russian element using the American as catalyst.

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8. Documenting now to make arrangements with A/S9, documents and cover some possibilities for the preparation some documents for which there is no power available at Headquarters. He suggested to the Planning on January 1960 and to show a permanent resident assigned to an Advisor in the case of transport leaving a secondary portability. With such a document it would be possible for him to live for extended periods abroad and still return to the U.S. The document is also acceptable to furnish information for registration and lengthy sojourn and even permanent working in those countries. As you are well aware, however, it is sometimes complicated or this according to travel outside from one European country to another with this attendant because various countries are different to obtain. This document is therefore intended for A/S9. Several other alternatives and combinations have been considered, including back-stopped and non-back-stopped, valid national passports for citizens of the legitimate authority. Also, documentation, while it might still be useful to special countries, is not appropriate for regular travel because A/S9 is widely known within the European Community and to some extent his presence in a given country will not be secret. The flag potential of an either document is obvious. Thus, basic documentation should, in Headquarters' view, be in true name, which will still allow A/S9 maximum freedom of movement. Having considered the documents of various countries available to us, the best solution seems to be a back-stopped legal Mexican passport. This document allows non-air travel in all countries of Europe, the exception of France, Norway, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. In these cases visas can normally be obtained on short notice. To the rest of the Near East, including Turkey, and some Central American countries, a visa is also required. This document is also required. The duration of the Mexican passport is two years, with the option of renewal or, perhaps preferable in A/S9's case, issuance of a new passport on the basis of the old one. It should not be necessary for A/S9 to contact Mexican diplomatic authorities throughout the entire period of his use of the passport unless we choose to renew it legally after two years. In conjunction with issuance of the Mexican passport, KAPOK will take steps to safeguard A/S9's U.S. residence status through liaison with embassy.

9. There is an older option available in the decree. Although the Mexican passport is legally issued and valid up to one year, it is not renewable, A/S9 has nothing to do with justification for the possession of the document. Furthermore, there existually are circumstances in which he might be put on the spot without any trip or "visa" or "exit permit" or "exit stamp". However, he can demand English. For further information on this subject, available locally, please refer to [ ] who recently served at MEXICO City Headquarters.

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10. Headquarters has also weighed with the question of A/2's cover. Obviously his cover should include an active economic role. However, A/2's foreign cultural activities and publications center, as A/2 will be unlikely assigned to commanding A/1, supports and substantiates my theory concerning with A/2's and A/2. It would seem best to affiliate A/2 with the Foreign Legion or A/2 is assigned to the British Legion in order to justify giving the group A/2's direct control over him and to allow him freedom from command A/1 control. (See my notes all, a fairly junior on the A/1 Legion. He is ordered by me to stand from the point of view age, service and position in A/2.) As in A/2's feasibility, however, that his task with A/2 Legion while carrying up which as British cavalry. It are therefore working out an arrangement for a dual responsibility cover job not requiring cover officer or basis of work but involving either an additional agent or a additional part-time job or both or some other form of connection or commercial arrangement. This would certainly provide A/2 with one or his financial support and vice versa for him travel. He shall keep you informed as the details are worked out.

11. From previous American correspondence the field is probably more than A/1 has sufficient operations interests to at least three international, create intended for this summer. We have organized 15 August through 21 September, the Conference of Ministers in Stockholm. If so invited and, to a lesser extent, events requiring thus A/2 to be in Europe between the middle end of July in order to make suitable preparations. The proposed documentation outlined above calls for several necessary steps which we are negotiating in order to meet this deadline.

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